ACCESS TO PESTICIDES AS A SOURCE OF TRADE DISPUTE by Short, Cameron & Freshwater, David
95
Cameron Short and David Freshwater1
ACCESS TO PESTICIDES AS A SOURCE OF
TRADE DISPUTE
INTRODUCTION
Pesticide use has two significant implications for trade disputes in
agricultural products. The first is that SPS rules in trade agreements allow
individual countries to establish the maximum allowable level of exposure
for their citizens to pesticide residues in food by setting maximum residue
levels (MRLs) or tolerances for various food products. This clearly pro-
vides an opportunity to set levels so low that they exclude imports from
countries that may use either unapproved compounds or allow higher resi-
due levels. This has obvious trade implications. The second mechanism is
more subtle since it involves farm level production effects. If specific pes-
ticides are available in one country but not in another, this can affect both
crop yields and quality, and relative costs of production, thereby affecting
the competitive position of a country.
Because pesticides can only legally be used in a specific country if
they have a label that is approved by that country, it is virtually impossible
for farmers or anyone else to import pesticides. An important consequence
____________________
1  The authors express their thanks to Ken McEwan for sharing his data for this paper.
Any errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.96 Keeping the Borders Open
of these government created barriers to trade is that they essentially en-
courage chemical companies to practice price discrimination. Thus the
case of pesticides is also of more general interest because it illustrates how
regulation and strong product differentiation can have the same effects in
terms of market segmentation- -with differences in prices and product avail-
ability -- as tariffs and quantitative restrictions. Pesticide regulation is also
of interest because it is one of the areas where there is extensive coopera-
tion among the regulatory agencies in Canada, Mexico and the United
States to bring about harmonization. So there is a clear effort by regulators
to try to find ways to resolve the problems of differences in national regu-
latory standards. However these efforts, while addressing some of the cur-
rent trade issues, are not likely to resolve all of them.
At present the most visible form of dispute stems from perceptions
and specific observations by producers that certain pesticides cost more
on one side of the border than on the other. Higher prices are seen as
creating a competitive disadvantage relative to farmers growing the same
crop for the same international market. Price differential issues tend to be
mainly found for pesticides used on high volume crops that are sold as
commodities, where controlling costs is a critical element in determining
levels of profit among producers.
A somewhat less visible dispute area involves the availability of
specific products. Some pesticides may not be available in one country but
are in the other. On a more refined level, some may be available in both
countries but are licensed for application on a different set of crops, once
again creating access problems. In general, the current concern with ac-
cess is more common for minor use pesticides, that is, uses where demand
is relatively low and there is the possibility that the pesticide cannot be
supplied on a cost effective basis under the standard regulatory scheme.
However there are occasionally cases where a product is available for a
specific use on a major crop in one country and not in others, often be-
cause of lags in the regulatory process. In the long run, access may be-
come an even more important issue if regulation reduces the incentive for
companies to develop and register pesticides in certain countries.97
Because pesticides are an increasingly vital input for farmers, sig-
nificant differences in availability or in prices will continue to cause com-
plaints. As other trade barriers are dismantled SPS, decisions that influence
pesticide regulation could create significant trade barriers. Our analysis
suggests that the primary beneficiaries of barriers to the free flow of pesti-
cides across national borders are the pesticide manufacturers. Such barri-
ers to arbitrage create an ideal environment for price discrimination. Thus
it should not be surprising to economists to see significant price differ-
ences in prices among countries. Harmonization of regulation is thus the
first step in removing the regulatory barriers that create incentives for price
discrimination by pesticide producers.
Background information, which provides a context for access to
pesticides as a source of trade disputes, is presented in the next section.
This is followed by a brief description of the regulatory process including
a description of harmonization goals and steps being undertaken to achieve
this goal. Price and availability issues are then described with conclusions
presented in the final section.
THE CONTEXT FOR DISPUTES
The Role Of Pesticides
Pesticides are a class of compounds used in agriculture to enhance
the quality and/or quantity of desirable species of plant or animals. Pesti-
cides control pests by either killing or weakening them, or by making the
treated product unattractive to the pest. Pests take the form of animals,
insects, plants, fungi and nematodes, but the defining feature of a pest is
that it causes an adverse effect upon some species of plant or animal that
the farmer is trying to produce. While natural forms of pesticides have
been employed since the very early stages of agriculture, pest manage-
ment took on new significance following World War II as advances in
chemistry and biology combined with the mechanization of agriculture
and wide spread use of synthetic fertilizer to transform production tech-
nology. USDA estimates that 86% of the acreage planted to five major
crops (wheat, corn, cotton, soybeans and fall potatoes) were treated at
least once with a herbicide (USDA 2000, p. 19). Of these crops cotton
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made the most use of all forms of pesticides and wheat the least . Other
USDA analysis shows that fruits and vegetables have a far higher per acre
use rates and employ a broader spectrum of pesticides (USDA 2001, p.
13).  In production systems that are based upon intensive land manage-
ment, there is an inevitable development of significant pest problems. This
means there is a steady demand for new compounds to replace those that
become less effective. Pest control products provide a means to sustain the
production methods that have increased food production at a faster rate
than world population growth, facilitate a reduction in the share of total
employment required in farming, and lower the real cost of food for con-
sumers. Although outlays on pest control products represent a relatively
minor share of the total cost of food and fiber production, the timely appli-
cation of pest control products can mean the difference between no pro-
duction and a normal crop.
But pesticides have significant costs inherent in their use. Because
they are toxic by design, they can harm non-target species, including ap-
plicators, bystanders and wildlife. Pesticide residues can become embed-
ded in food products with possible harmful effects for consumers. In addi-
tion, intensive use of pesticides often leads to species evolution in the
target pests so that they become resistant. As our understanding of the
adverse consequences of many older pesticides has grown they have been
removed from use and replaced by other compounds that have fewer nega-
tive effects. However the search for effective but safe pest control prod-
ucts has become more difficult over time due to, pest resistance, govern-
ment imposing more stringent limits on acceptable risks to non-target spe-
cies, and the simple fact that we have made all the easy discoveries.
While the use of pesticides carries an inherent risk, there would be
severe costs if their use were prohibited. Table 1 demonstrates the impor-
tance of pesticides for the production of some major crops world wide.
Without Crop Protection (CP in the table) lower yields, greater field and
post harvest losses and declines in the quality of product lead to a reduced
supply of food and fiber and consequently higher prices. As a result, there
would have to be a significant expansion of land under cultivation, which
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creased levels of erosion. Finally cultivation practices would have to re-
turn to more intensive use of plows, discs and harrows.
Stakeholder Interests
Because pesticides are both useful and dangerous, they have fallen
into the class of products that is subject to significant government regula-
tion. In many ways pesticides are like pharmaceuticals, and many of the
pharmaceutical companies either still produce pesticides, or once did. Both
types of compounds are used to reduce or prevent an undesirable effect.
Both types of compounds result in the potential for adverse side effects.
And our knowledge of the full effects of these products often comes only
well after they have been in use for a significant length of time. While we
can devote resources to predicting the effects of the introduction of a chemi-
cal compound, be it a drug or a pesticide, into the human population and
the environment we can never be certain that we have identified all the
consequences.
Government regulation of how pesticides are tested, which ones
are deemed acceptable to use, how they are produced and marketed and
how they are used provides a means to identify and manage risks. Regula-
tion involves benefits and costs for the various parties involved in the pro-
cess. These are the chemical companies who produce and sell pesticides,
the general public who consume food treated with pesticides, farmers who
buy the pesticides, bureaucrats who regulate their use, citizens with spe-
cial concerns about the environment and food safety, and government it-
self.
While chemical companies often object to the costs incurred in
getting a compound through the registration process, they also derive sig-
nificant benefits from the existence of regulation. While a long registration
process is a burden to firms that are trying to receive registration, it is a
clear benefit to firms that will face competition from a competing com-
pound once it too clears registration. The combination of a patent and a
difficult registration review can provide a significant window of protec-
tion.101
The general public faces significant information problems in deal-
ing with pesticides in terms of food safety and adverse environmental im-
pacts. Absent regulation they would have great difficulty in determining
which food products had been treated with which compounds and in en-
suring that non-target species are not being harmed. Regulation provides
the assurance that only specific chemicals that have been rigorously tested
are being used and that farmers have instructions on the safest way to use
those products. Thus the regulatory process is an important part of per-
suading consumers that food production is being carried out in a manner
that protects their interest and it reduces the amount of time that individu-
als have to spend individually trying to ascertain food quality. Because the
costs of ensuring food safety have been reduced, the aggregate demand
for food is higher than it would other wise be. This outward shift of the
demand curve results in increased consumer surplus and in benefits for
farmers and, indirectly, for chemical companies.
As a group, farmers benefit from regulation because there is an
enhanced demand for food, but also because regulation results in their
having uniform access to information on how to appropriately use chemi-
cals. The costs of registration are passed through to farmers and they in
turn pass some portion of them on to consumers depending on farmers
market power as a group and an upward sloping supply curve . But since
pesticide use is so widespread in agriculture, it is likely that even with
regulatory costs the net effect of pesticides is beneficial for most farmers.
Farmers also benefit from the development of new pesticides for two sig-
nificant reasons. The first is the common problem of pest resistance that
makes many compounds less effective over time. The second is a trend to
more pest specific compounds that have shorter half-lives, which when
combined with lower levels of applicator exposure, reduces the health risk
to farmers and field workers. Initially farmers relied upon regulation as a
way to ensure efficacy, at a time when firms providing pesticides were less
reliable providers of high quality compounds. Indeed the original function
of regulation was to guarantee that pesticides worked as their promoters
promised. Over time, as the production of pesticides was taken over by
large firms and the registration process became more costly, the regulatory
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concern with efficacy became less critical because firms would not bother
to register ineffective compounds.
Government has a significant incentive to engage in regulation
because of its responsibility for maintaining both public health and a high
quality environment. While a scheme of self-regulation by the chemical
industry might provide many of the benefits of regulation, there is a larger
danger that a major adverse event could occur if a company acted outside
the set of internal rules. Government would then be faced with having to
reverse any damage to people or the larger environment and then restoring
public confidence in pesticide use. Also by being directly engaged in the
registration process, the government has better information on the poten-
tial risks and benefits associated with each compound that is on the mar-
ket.
From an operational perspective, there are potential problems as-
sociated with government regulation. These are primarily traditional  prin-
cipal-agent issues involving the bureaucracy. There is the potential for regu-
lators to be captured by special interests who either favor or oppose the
use of pesticides, or regulators may shirk their responsibilities to act effi-
ciently, resulting in higher costs. The creation of NAFTA may create a new
set of principal-agent problems, where regulators may oppose harmoniza-
tion because of its implications for their autonomy, staffing levels or per-
haps only due to organizational inertia.2
THE REGULATORY PROCESS
In both Canada and the United States the original objective of pes-
ticide regulation was the protection of  farmers from inaccurate promises
that pests would be effectively controlled by a given compound. Depart-
ments of Agriculture were the obvious location for this function since effi-
cacy issues were best addressed by agencies with a technical knowledge
____________________
2  The agent is hired by the principal and given certain responsibilities. Principal-agent
issues arise when the principal cannot easily monitor the agent’s actions or assure that
they reflect his interests.103
of farming. In the 1960s a growing body of information on the persistence
of pesticides in the environment and their harmful effects upon non-target
species of wildlife, especially birds and fish, prompted demands for more
thorough assessments of pesticides to determine their environmental fate.
Concerns over applicator safety and potential hazards from pesticide resi-
dues in food also became significant. This led to a major redirection of
pesticide regulation away from efficacy and toward the unintended conse-
quences of pesticide use. Through the 1960s and 1970s, as scientific knowl-
edge improved and the ability to detect pesticide residues grew, there was
increased evidence that many older chemicals had adverse effects that
exceeded their benefits. This led to pressure to remove registration from
agriculture agencies because of a recognized conflict of interest between
safety issues and the core agency concern with optimizing the production
of food and fiber. In the United States regulatory  responsibility rests with
the Environmental Protection Agency with a focus on the broad protection
of human, wildlife and natural habitats, while the Pest Management Regu-
latory Agency of Health Canada is charged with protecting human well-
being. Consequently, the impacts of pesticide regulation on farm profit-
ability and the competitive position of agriculture are now secondary ele-
ments in the decision process.
In the last decade both Canada and the United States implemented
major legislative changes in pesticide regulation. In the United States the
Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) of 1996 significantly changed the
way pesticides were regulated although there was no major change in the
nature of the agencies responsible for pesticide regulation.  The major
elements of FQPA were: repeal of the Delaney Clause to allow the pres-
ence of carcinogenic compounds in food if the level of presence is consid-
ered to pose no risk; creation of a new standard for assessing exposure, the
“risk cup” that looks at all pathways of human exposure to classes of com-
pounds, instead of focusing on exposure on a compound by compound
basis; explicit attention to the possibility that infants and children may
have more adverse consequences from a given level of exposure than
adults; creation of a relatively short time-line for reassessing the registra-
tion status of all licensed pesticides using current standards; and elimina-
tion of economic benefit as a factor in the registration decision.
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One consequence of FQPA has been a focus on two broad classes
of compounds, organophosphates and carbamates, that are widely used
ingredients in insecticides used on both major field crops and on fruits and
vegetables. In many cases there are no obvious substitutes for insecticides
based upon these materials and there is a concern that if these products are
de-licensed there could be significant impacts on production. These im-
pacts could include production practices in other countries if EPA set maxi-
mum residue levels (MRLs) or tolerances at a point where crops treated
with the compounds could not enter the United States. However a more
likely outcome is that de-licensing in the United States would result in
similar action in Canada and probably in other countries.
In Canada, the Pest Control Products Act of 1995 transferred au-
thority for the regulation of pesticides from a number of agencies includ-
ing Agriculture Canada to Health Canada, and created the Pest Manage-
ment Regulatory Agency (PMRA) within Health Canada to carry out all
federal pesticide regulatory functions. PMRA is mandated to protect hu-
man health and the environment by minimizing risks associated with the
use of pesticides. In general, PMRA and EPA follow similar procedures
when evaluating pesticides for registration. PMRA continues to examine
efficacy as part of the Canadian registration process and like EPA consid-
ers exposure levels for children separately from adults. Unlike EPA, PMRA
has an explicit responsibility to investigate and promote non-pesticide based
control strategies as part of its risk mitigation mandate.
Process For Resolving Trade Irritants
For more than a decade pesticide regulatory agencies in Canada
and the United States have been involved in efforts to coordinate their
regulatory processes. Following the introduction of NAFTA, this process
expanded to include Mexico and resulted in the formation of the NAFTA
Technical Working Group (TWG) on pesticides. Members of the TWG
come from the various agencies with regulatory responsibility in the three
countries. The TWG provides a forum for developing ways to better inte-
grate pesticide registration within the context of each nation’s specific leg-
islative framework. In particular, the TWG has developed procedures for
identifying and resolving five categories of trade irritants:105
• Category A- -an MRL/tolerance exists in the exporting country
but it is lower in the importing country so the product is out of
compliance;
• Category B- -an MRL/tolerance exists in the exporting country
but one does not exist, or is lower, in the importing country;
• Category C- -a pesticide-commodity combination is registered
in one country but not in another, and growers in the country
where the use is not registered wish to have that option;
• Category D- -a discrepancy is detected resulting from a non-
registered use in the exporting country; and
• Category E- -the exporting country has established a time-lim-
ited tolerance but full registration does not exist in the importing
country.  (Trade Irritant Process Team, Dec. 18, 1998 p. 1-2)
In each case the cause of an irritant is defined as a mismatch in terms of
registration status that results in a commodity entering a country without
there being an appropriate tolerance level in place for residues. This ad-
dresses the first type of trade impact -- barriers to trade that arise because
of inconsistent regulations on exposure levels among the three countries.
Farmers have complained both about price differences between
the two countries and the differential availability of pesticides across the
border. A striking element in this classification scheme is that price differ-
entials are not even mentioned as a potential source of irritation. The simple
explanation for the focus on residue tolerances is that registration agencies
are not involved in the analysis of prices once a compound is on the mar-
ket. Their role is to monitor safety and to some extent how well the pesti-
cide does its job. Reinforcing this focus on residue levels is the right of
countries under NAFTA to block imports only where they can show that
the residue level is not consistent with domestic standards.
Category C issues do address the important question of differen-
tials in registration status. In this case the remedy involves two distinct
elements. The country where the pesticide-commodity pair is not regis-
tered should establish a tolerance level to resolve the issue of imported
product. Then the company that produces the pesticide must decide whether
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to apply for registration in the country where the use is not allowed. Note
that from the perspective of the Trade Irritant Process Team there is no
suggestion that equal access is a specific item that should be promoted by
the governments as a way to diffuse irritants.
Current Harmonization Efforts
Some of the other NAFTA Technical Working Groups function
mainly as a forum to exchange information on upcoming regulation or
perhaps provide an opportunity to discuss trade irritants. The NAFTA Tech-
nical Working Group on Pesticides has gone further in clearly articulating
goals of harmonization and working toward creating a North American
market for pesticides in which “growers in all three countries can access
the same pest control tools.” The TWG on pesticides recognized, soon
after it was formed in 1996, that the NAFTA free trade objective could not
be met unless barriers posed by regulation were eliminated. They have
approached harmonization through agreements on work sharing and the
creation of a joint application process that includes a common data sub-
mission and format, and a coordinated review process. The working group
has begun work on a NAFTA label that would be used in all three coun-
tries.
Joint submission is a significant step in reducing the cost of ap-
proval of new pesticides. Assembling the data required for registration is
both time consuming and expensive especially in a country where the
level of expected revenue after registration might be an issue. Work shar-
ing offers potential of considerable cost saving on the part of the regula-
tory agencies. Each nation takes a piece of the data in a given registration
package and performs an evaluation that will be accepted by the other
parties. The additional time and expense savings and the chance that com-
pounds will be registered in all three countries can have an impact on
prices.
With a common label, issues of own-use importation would largely
be resolved because every country would have agreed upon a common set
of MRLs for the specific applications. Because the label would be legal in
each country there would be no reason to block a farmer from crossing the107
border to purchase a specific chemical. Note that a common label does not
have to mean that all uses or application rates are standard. While a farmer
in one country could purchase a product that had a common label, it could
only be used for those purposes and at those rates that were legal within
that country. In particular, differences in environmental fate and impacts
on non-target species could still make some uses possible in one country
but not in another. In addition allowable uses could vary from country to
country because of differences in the patterns of exposure. In particular,
the use of a “risk cup” (see p. 103) sets an upper bound on exposure to
specific classes of compounds. Because patterns of exposure and use of
the various classes of compounds could easily vary from nation to nation,
even if all three countries adopted the same maximum exposure level,
there could be differences in which pesticide-commodity combinations fill
up the cup, and as a result differences in types of acceptable use for spe-
cific pesticides.
For agricultural producers, harmonization is mostly a positive thing.
If the costs of producing a chemical are reduced, including the cost of
registration, this should result in lower input costs. If companies can pro-
duce for a continental market, farmers may also reap the benefits from any
scale economies available to the chemical companies. In addition aggre-
gating demand over a continental market may allow chemicals to be de-
veloped or registered for uses that would not be economically viable oth-
erwise. Similarly, while farmers may benefit from lower costs and a poten-
tially larger range of products so too should farm chemical companies and
food consumers. This suggests that efforts to harmonize pesticide registra-
tion procedures and establish uniform MRLs are beneficial to all parties.
However this is possibly too simplistic a perspective on the subject. The
most obvious issue is that there may in fact be fundamental differences in
levels of acceptable risk among the three societies so that a common MRL
is not possible. Without a common MRL it becomes almost impossible to
treat North America as a single market for pesticides. Even if it is possible
to resolve the registration package and MRL issue, regulators may still
come to different conclusions based upon differences in environmental
fate. If environmental differences are significant between nations then it is
reasonable to expect different registration decisions.
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Further, it is not clear that it is necessarily in the interest of chemi-
cal companies, and at least some producer groups, to move to a single mar-
ket for pesticides. The current system, although imposing additional registra-
tion costs, results in the chemical companies being able to segment demand.
The resulting ability to price differently in various markets could convey suf-
ficiently higher revenues that more than offset the higher costs of multiple
expenses for production and registration. In addition, given the usual assump-
tion that the demand for food products is relatively price inelastic, it is possible
that limiting access to chemicals makes sense for those farmers who already
have access. Doing so results in a lower ability to compete in some countries
and hence higher profits for farmers in the country where the compound is
available. To the extent that harmonization facilitates higher levels of produc-
tion in those places where it was previously difficult, and leads to lower prices
for all producers of the crop, existing producers are worse off. Thus some
commodity organizations in one country may oppose the development of
a uniform pesticide registration procedure if they believe it will stimulate
farmers in another country to increase their production.
While there has been considerable progress in finding ways to har-
monize the registration process, it is really just beginning and barriers to
free trade in pesticides will remain for many years. There is at present
several outstanding differences in the regulatory approach between Canada
and the United States such as the extent of cost recovery and the Canadian
requirement for efficacy testing. Joint submission is currently only an op-
tion although there is attempt to encourage its use by expedited process-
ing. Only a small number of completely new pesticides are evaluated each
year and there are no plans to harmonize the relatively large number of
pesticides that have already been approved. It is too early, therefore, to see
whether this model of regulatory harmonization will be able create a single
harmonized North American market within a reasonable time period.
SOURCES OF CONFLICT
Possible Causes Of Price Divergences
Implicitly patent and brand name rights allow a company to exer-
cise market power as a means of recovering the research and development109
investment needed to bring a new pesticide to market. Companies can
therefore price their product at the point where marginal revenue equals
marginal cost and there is no reason to think they would charge a lower
price. In addition, geographic borders, when combined with the separate
regulatory systems, provide a  basis for price discrimination. In addition
within a country common practices such as volume or other discounts can
be seen as evidence of additional price discrimination. Under price dis-
crimination, the monopolist prices in each country according to the fol-
lowing:
where MC is marginal cost, MR i, p i and eta_ i are marginal revenue, price,
and demand elasticity respectively in country i. This implies that a higher
price will be charged in the country with the less elastic demand and the
price  would only be the same if by chance the demand elasticity is the
same.
Farmers demand for pesticides is a derived demand. We might ex-
pect that demand would be more inelastic if substitutes for the pesticide
are not nearly as effective, if the pesticide is a small portion of cost and if
the demand for the product produced by farmers is more inelastic. This
will vary from one side of the border to the other both for economic rea-
sons and because there are two regulatory systems. Differences in agricul-
tural policy support programs affect the effective farm commodity supply
functions thereby altering farm level demand for pesticides. In particular
even though market prices for commodities may be about the same in both
countries the aggregate return to farm production is made up from market
revenue and government transfers. It seems reasonable that chemical com-
panies would consider this in their pricing decisions. Differences in de-
mand will also occur if the same pesticide is registered for different com-
modities on either side of the border. Availability of different substitute
pesticides on both sides of the border can also have an effect.
Surveys of price differentials have been conducted for a number
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These surveys are all based upon asking pesticide dealers in both coun-
tries that are relatively close to the border to provide their retail sales price
for specific compounds. The prices are standardized for units and concen-
tration of the effective ingredient and then adjusted using the prevailing
exchange rate. Carlson, McEwan and Deen [1999] report average prices
for the period 1993-97 for 32 pesticides. Average prices are higher in
Canada for 19 of these with the price differential being greater than 10% of
the average price in both countries for 11 of the 19; U.S. prices are more
than 10% greater than the mean price for four pesticides. Several factors
may result in differences in mean price differences between the two coun-
tries, which has nothing to do with price discrimination:
• mean price differences may be within the price variability in both
countries so that differences in the means are just chance out-
comes rather than systematic results;
• price variability may be caused by variability in the cost struc-
ture of retailers;
• some retailers may be using particular chemicals as loss-leaders.
McEwan provided his 1997-2001 data on five pesticides to allow
us to evaluate these possibilities. He collected price information from up to
five retail outlets in eleven Canadian locations, eleven times a year. Similar
information was collected from seven U.S. locations. He performed the
adjustments to the U.S. data before forwarding the data. We regressed de-
flated prices against a system of trend and dummy variables by location to
determine mean and variance by location. The estimated equations are
summarized in Table 2; while Figure 1 shows results for the product Treflan.
Figure 1 shows a pattern of mean and variance that is highly ho-
mogeneous within each country and across the border. There is very little
evidence of differences in cost structure, or that retailers in any of the
locations use Treflan as a loss leader.
Figure 2 and 3 shows the very different results obtained for
Roundup and Malathion (See Appendix for Furadan and 2,4 D 95% price
confidence intervals).  Roundup is much more expensive in the United
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homogenous price pattern within each country and the significant differ-
ence between countries imply that we are not seeing the effects of retail
level phenomena but rather the effects of the pricing policy followed by
the manufacturer such as simple price discrimination.


















































































Figure 2: Roundup 95% Price Confidence Intervals.


















































































Figure 1: Treflan 95% Price Confidence Intervals.113
Other more complicated marketing strategies could also result in
the price patterns observed. Companies might be expected to recover the
cost of registration in their wholesale prices and avoid cross-subsidizing
registration costs in one country with revenues from another. In addition,
each country provides patent protection for a defined length of time which
creates and incentive for chemical companies to attempt to recover their
investment costs within the patent life so they have adequate revenue to
remain in business on an ongoing basis. The registration process takes
place within this patent window, and as the regulators in Canada have
already recognized that the process is longer in Canada, then there is a
shorter period of time available to the company to recoup its costs, and
hence a higher price is required. While these may be important factors in
pricing policy, the contrasting results for Roundup and Malathion suggest
that demand factors are more important at least for some pesticides.
However, it should be born in mind that there is nothing illegal or
even immoral in price discrimination in this situation. Patents and other
marketing rights are extended to the companies so that then can recover
the cost of product development and approval. Indeed, it would be sur-
prising if they did not practice price discrimination. To the extent that price





















































Figure 3: Malathion 95% Price Confidence Intervals.
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discrimination is a significant factor in providing a high enough rate of
return to justify investing in research and development of new pesticides it
may provide long run benefits even though it has short term costs.
The level of awareness of cross border price differentials and avail-
ability is generally a declining function of proximity to the border. Conse-
quently those farmers arguing that they are being unfairly treated gener-
ally are correct in claiming that pest problems, broad environmental condi-
tions, and production practices are similar on both sides of the boundary.
In these cases, farmers justifiably wonder why it is possible for their neigh-
bors to either have access to products they cannot use, or why in an era of
free trade they are forced to pay a higher price for the same pesticide. So
differential access can be important. Because a far larger share of agricul-
tural production in Canada takes place in close proximity to the border and
the size of the Canadian market for most compounds and uses is signifi-
cantly smaller, both price and access issues have been more common in
Canada.
Recently the most visible event took place in the United States and
concerned price differentials on pesticides licensed for use on canola (see
Taylor and Koo). Farmers in North Dakota argue they can buy pesticides
for use on canola at lower prices in Canada, and that their growing envi-
ronment is similar to that in Manitoba and Saskatchewan so that they should
be allowed to use Canadian pesticides. Allowing these and other farmers
to import pesticides for their own use would resolve price and availability
differentials and be consistent with the principles of NAFTA.
The most persuasive bureaucratic case for own-use importation is
in those instances where the irritant is strongest, right along the border.
There is probably no compelling reason why a compound that is licensed
in one country could not be used in another. Further, if the compound is
licensed in both countries for the same use, and there are significant cross-
border price differences then allowing own-use imports is the obvious way
to equilibrate prices.115
But own-use importation opens up other issues. For example, there
is the question of cost recovery. Licensing a product is an expensive un-
dertaking in both countries that companies have to recover through their
retail prices. Significant levels of own-use imports could reduce the incen-
tive to apply for a license, and without the data that is part of the approval
process, we would be less sure that there are no adverse local consequences
from pesticide use. Consider canola further. Canola is also grown further
south in the United States in a double crop rotation. Here it is less clear that
there would be no adverse consequences associated with importing prod-
uct from Canada and using it according to Canadian label requirements.
NAFTA harmonization with a NAFTA label would resolve this issue. Al-
lowing own use importation would force the pace of regulatory reform
needed to protect users and the environment while creating a single North
American market.
Availability  Issues
In the context of the existing regulatory structure the main issue
with availability is that consumers are protected from exposure to residue
levels from pesticide and farm product combinations that have not been
explicitly registered. Implicit in this approach is a reliance on imports of
food products to meet consumer needs in cases where specific compounds
are not available and their absence limits the ability for domestic produc-
tion. This approach is understandable from a public health perspective
because it avoids all the costs associated with testing a large number of
possible uses, as well as potential problems with worker exposure, envi-
ronmental fate and non-target species effects in the importing country.
However it does place potentially significant impediments on farmers as
well as raising the interesting issue of government protecting imports at
the expense of domestic production.
As noted earlier in the discussion of the procedures established by
the Trade Irritant Process Team, the decision on availability is seen as be-
ing largely outside the domain of the regulatory structure. However other
aspects of pesticide regulations make this an important topic. As regula-
tions become more sophisticated, old products are re-tested to ensure they
meet current standards and pesticides are grouped into classes with maxi-
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mum exposure levels for the entire class (risk cup), with the result that the
number of compounds farmers have for managing specific pests in a large
number of crops is falling. Pesticides that have been in use for a long time
are being withdrawn from the market either because they do not meet
current standards or because they do not have a large enough sales vol-
ume to justify the expense of submitting a new registration package. This
can leave producers with limited options in terms of pest control strategies
and in extreme cases make the production of specific crops unprofitable
Pesticide manufacturers continue to submit both new compounds
and new uses for registration but as the costs of registration increase, manu-
facturers are concentrating on providing compounds for large volume
markets. As a result there is little effort to develop replacement compounds
in  minor use markets even though from a farmers perspective there may
be no real alternative to a compound that is being withdrawn from use. To
some extent minor use status is a relative concept. For example much of
the fruit and vegetable production in the United States involves a minor
use of pesticides relative to row and field crops like corn and wheat. But
fruit and vegetable production in the United Sates still represents a large
enough market that it is worth the support of chemical manufacturers. By
contrast, fruit and vegetable production in Canada is both a minor market,
relative to row and field crops, and small enough that the volume of sales
may not be enough to warrant registering a compound for use in Canada
even if it is available in the United States for the same crop. Thus, a gov-
ernment may be trying to establish high value agricultural production as a
way to enhance farm incomes and increase the viability of farming in re-
gions with large urban populations. But without effective pest control op-
tions, the long-term viability of these farms is doubtful. Although pesticide
outlays are a fairly small share of total costs of production, if the substitute
methods have considerably higher costs there may be a difficulty main-
taining production. This suggests that the registration process should look
beyond ensuring that exposure levels are harmonized and recognize that
precluding domestic production may have adverse consequences in terms
of farm structure, rural environment and seasonal access to fresh produce,
as well as the already recognized indirect positive effects of lower levels of
exposure.117
In particular, producers of fruits and vegetables in Canada are con-
cerned that they will soon be forced out of business if many more of the
currently available chemicals are withdrawn from use and are not replaced
with equally effective products. Even though it may be possible over time
to adjust production practices to use alternative pest control approaches, it
is unlikely that most of the existing producers will be able to do so. Their
investments are tied up in a production structure that is predicated upon
the use of pesticides, and changing that production structure can require
major new investments that they cannot afford. If existing compounds were
withdrawn in both Canada and the United States but new ones were regis-
tered only in the United States, a situation would be created for a signifi-
cant trade dispute to develop. This means that enhancing harmonization is
particularly important for minor use products.
CONCLUSION: LESSONS FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Pesticides are controlled substances in all NAFTA counties, so how
they are regulated greatly influences pest control strategies available to
farmers. Because pesticides are an increasingly important part of the most
common farm production technologies and, because NAFTA has essen-
tially opened the borders to the free flow of agricultural products, differ-
ences in how pesticides are regulated can affect the competitive position
of farmers in the three countries. A focus on agricultural trade suggests
that harmonization of regulations is a desirable outcome because it would
allow a level playing field in terms of farmer access.
However the other side of the pesticide issue is that pesticides can
have undesirable consequences in terms of human health impacts and ad-
verse environmental impacts. While the level of human health impact does
not vary significantly from citizen to citizen, this is not as true for environ-
mental fate. Different ecosystems may be more or less susceptible to the
same quantity of pesticide. Moreover individual countries may choose to
set different levels of acceptable risk for both their population and their
environment. Thus even if everyone agrees on a common science proto-
col, the policy decisions may differ.
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Despite the potential for different decisions to be drawn on appro-
priate levels of exposure, there are still strong arguments for harmoniza-
tion. Indeed, NAFTA only extended prior efforts to reduce the costs of
registration for companies and to adopt uniform protocols for assessing
registration packages. Because registration involves large up-front outlays
that can only be recovered over an extended period of time, cost reduc-
tions in the registration process can make a difference in the availability,
especially  for minor use compounds. Similarly, harmonization of registra-
tion procedures can also lead to simultaneous registration that is advanta-
geous to farmers in countries that would otherwise have to wait longer for
a product.
The potential for differences in pesticide regulations to affect trade
flows among NAFTA countries has already been recognized and is being
addressed. The current focus of the Technical Working Group on Pesti-
cides is on ensuring that countries establish maximum residue levels on
the basis of legitimate public health concerns not as a form of non-tariff
barrier. National pesticide regulatory agencies are developing ways to share
work loads in registration, ensure that common protocols are adopted and
work toward common maximum residue levels of pesticides in food prod-
ucts. However this approach does not address the second trade issue of
differences in access or prices affecting the competitive position of farm-
ers.
Significant cross-border price differentials exist for some pesticides
including large volume products and market size differences do not pro-
vide an obvious explanation. But for other compounds there is no signifi-
cant cross-border price difference. These results can be interpreted in three
different ways. The first is that the existing system in essence creates a
segmented market that manufacturers can readily exploit to their advan-
tage. Because a pesticide can only be used in a country if it has a national
label, there is an effective barrier to arbitrage. Price differentials reflect the
presence of this monopoly power. A second interpretation is that differ-
ences in price reflect differences in markets. These could include differ-
ences in registration costs or marketing and distribution costs. The fact that
only some prices seem to be higher and that there is variability across119
countries in terms of which has the highest price is not necessarily incon-
sistent with this perspective. The last interpretation is that both the previ-
ous models can apply. For some compounds, monopoly power may exist
and be exploited and for others real cost differences may cause differences
in price.
One way to resolve the price/availability issue would be to allow
farmers to import pesticides for their own use from other NAFTA coun-
tries, providing that they followed the label directions on use. This policy
is effectively a variation of recognizing the equivalence of the other coun-
try  regulatory system and could be followed by each country individually
or in partnership with other NAFTA countries.3  A grace period could be
specified, allowing the regulatory agencies to identify specific pesticides/
use combinations that might need to be restricted because of special expo-
sure issues. Currently all pesticide imports are “positive list” items which
are prohibited because their import is presumed to lead to misuse. This
solution would effectively transform control of pesticide trade to a nega-
tive list system. If adopted by all NAFTA countries it would pressure the
regulatory agencies to implement a fully harmonized regulatory proce-
dures in terms of chemical availability, accepted uses, permitted applica-
tion rates, environmental restrictions and public health standards. That is
there would be considerable pressure to develop a common label.
Such a policy would weaken the regulatory agencies’ abilities to
enforce their individual policies but might not make much difference if all
three countries followed similar practices and if labels contained detailed
geographic specifications. It would raise new issues for imported pesti-
cides since tariffs would come into play. And it would be more of a prob-
lem in Canada where the border is generally nearby for most farmers.
Transactions costs (information, distance, the red tape of dealing with cus-
toms) would limit this type of activity in the United States, except where
demand is sufficient to justify the additional expenses. At the extreme, it
____________________
3  One of the problems of free trade, well known to anyone living near the border, is that
cross border shopping has become much more complex because tariffs are far more
complicated and regulations more pervasive. Most of the free trade happens at the
wholesale level, while retail level trade has become much more restrictive.
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might make it more difficult to establish a higher standard of risk avoid-
ance and raises the (often imaginary) specter of the “race to the bottom.”
But to the extent that price differentials reflect the real cost of serv-
ing a given market, the long-term consequences of free trade could be
problematic. Pesticide manufacturers would no longer be in a position to
allocate costs to the appropriate parties. If they price compounds so that all
registration costs are embedded in a common price then producers in the
low cost country are implicitly subsidizing those in the higher cost coun-
try. If they choose not to pursue registration in the high cost country be-
cause they cannot recover their costs, then they are not likely to be able to
use a NAFTA label, and imports will not be allowed. If they choose to
price in each country so they cover actual costs, then farmers will make
their purchases in the lower cost country.
While farmers facing either higher prices or limited access, as well
as policy makers may see short term benefits from harmonizing prices in a
free trade zone it is important to separate short term and long term conse-
quences. For the most part the short term benefits have been the focus of
our discussion. However, in the long run one possible consequence of
allowing prices to equilibrate is that lower profit margins for pesticide
manufacturers could lead to lower investments in bringing new products
to market. Because of pest adaptation, farmers and society may be worse
off in the long run if new compounds are not available to replace existing
ones when they are no longer effective. This suggests that it is important to
assess the relative benefits of working toward a harmonized registration
process that creates a single continental market versus the possible disin-
centive of lower profits on new product development.
In an environment where trade in the final agricultural product ex-
ists, without harmonization of prices and access for inputs, the logical re-
sult is differences in returns to fixed factors. Since farmers in all countries
will receive the same market price for their product but farmers in one
country will have higher costs, their enterprises will be less profitable.
Over the long run this should lead to reduced levels of production and to121
the extent that farmland captures rents, lower land prices in the country
with less access or higher pesticide prices.
More stringent pesticide regulations have important implications
for efforts to expand the production of high value crops. If national agri-
culture policy is to diversify agriculture and move to higher value plant
products, especially in Canada, then  attention must be paid to the avail-
ability of minor use chemicals. Not only do high value crops tend to use a
broader range of compounds, but many of these compounds are relatively
old and are facing a difficult time meeting current safety standards as their
registration status is being re-evaluated. Because they are minor use prod-
ucts there is less incentive for companies to invest in developing substitute
pesticides, which may threaten the viability of some parts of agricultural
policy. However the ultimate pressure for harmonization is driven by eco-
nomics and it will have to be balanced against other issues such as public
health and environmental concerns.
Existing cooperation among regulatory bodies through the Tech-
nical Working Group provides the beginning of a model for trade harmo-
nization- -it provides a set of ways to cooperate, from joint registration, to
data exchange to informal consultation. This is a useful way to proceed,
instead of establishing a formal agreement, because it allows flexibility
and incremental extension once capabilities increase and demand is estab-
lished. But the process needs nurturing and ongoing commitments.
Finally, there are some obvious impediments to cooperation among
the pesticide regulatory agencies. These include bureaucratic inertia, regu-
latory capture, and ease of communication when three languages are in-
volved. Although progress can be seen, there are also examples of inertia.
However even with greater efforts to reduce trade frictions, there will still
be problems because the degree of change may not be fast enough for
some people and yet will be too fast for others.
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Figure A1: Furadan 95% Price Confidence Intervals.













































































Figure A2: 2,4 D 95% Price Confidence Intervals.
APPENDIX